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attorneys represent different sides of a legal issue to one where an attor-
ney openly represents adverse interests.
III. CONCLUSION
When a law firm recommends poison pill plans for one client then
challenges the constitutionality of like poison pills for another client, the
attorneys effectively question the constitutionality of their own advice.
Consequently, to avoid any ethical dilemma, attorneys who provide plan-
ning or drafting services should abstain from challenging the constitu-
tionality of antitakeover plans substantially similar to those they have
previously recommended.
Catherine R. Phillips
THE IMPACT OF THE SEC'S CASES AGAINST LEVINE
AND BOESKY ON THE ACTIVITIES OF
INVESTMENT BANKERS AND
ARBITRAGEURS
The Securities and Exchange Commission's recent, highly publicized
allegations of insider trading against Dennis Levine, Ivan Boesky, and
others announced to Wall Street intensified SEC enforcement of insider
trading sanctions against many professionals in the heart of the Wall
Street community. Reactions to these cases form a wide spectrum of
views. Some commentators applaud the crackdown on insider trading.'
Others believe the SEC has gone too far.2 Many investment bankers and
1. Glaberson, The SEC's Message to the Market on Insider Trading, Bus. WK., June 9, 1986,
at 83 (commentary praising the SEC for finally attacking the heart of information abuse); Laderman,
The Epidemic of Insider Trading, Bus. Wx., April 29, 1985, at 79-92 (although an overzealous SEC
could impair routine information gathering, vigorous enforcement effort against insider trading is
needed).
2. See, e.g., Macey, SEC Vigilant on Insider Trading-But Is It Within Law?, Wall St. J., May
28, 1986, at p. 34, col. 3; Seligman, Is Dennis a Menace?, FORTUNE, June 23, 1986, at 127 (criticizing
the SEC for failing to show how the investing public was hurt); Steward, SEC Insider Trading Case
Could Clog Pipeline Between Bankers, Arbitragers, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1986, at p.3, col. 2; The
SEC v. Wall Street, Wall St. J., May 28, 1986, at p. 32, col. 1 (criticizing the SEC's view that the
purpose of regulating the security markets is to ensure an honest crap game and charging that Wall
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arbitrageurs3 fear they may become the next targets of the SEC's crack-
down on insider trading.4
This Recent Development analyzes the SEC complaints against Levine
and Boesky in light of Chiarella v. United States5 and Dirks v. SEC,6 two
Supreme Court decisions limiting the scope of the insider trading laws.
This comparison shows that, on the one hand, these initial fears may
exaggerate the actions of the SEC. Although aspects of the complaints
appear to ignore Chiarella and Dirks, the cases against Levine and
Boesky ultimately fit squarely within these Supreme Court rulings.
On the other hand, the mere fact that the SEC has sought to enforce
the insider trading sanctions against these Wall Street insiders has some
independent signficance. Coupled with the SEC's apparent attempt to
extend the insider trading laws, these prosecutions will have a chilling
effect on the activities of arbitrageurs and investment bankers.7 Some
evidence of this effect already has surfaced.8 Thus, this Recent Develop-
ment discusses the potential effect of the Levine and Boesky cases on
these activities.
Street will not be able to discharge its economic function if no one of substance can buy or sell stock
without consulting a lawyer).
3. Arbitrageurs, "arbs" in market jargon, are professional speculators. In part, arbs invest in
the shares of companies that announce significant corporate transactions, such as tender offers,
mergers, bankruptcies, liquidations, and restructurings. In doing so, they absorb risk that individual
shareholders are unwilling to assume. For example, upon the announcement of a hostile tender offer
arbs will often purchase large blocks of stock in the target company. Shareholders sell their shares
to the arbs at a price somewhere between the pre-existing market price and the tender offer price to
transfer the risk that the offer will fail to the arbs. These activities help to stabilize market prices in
the face of substantial uncertainty. See generally Cole, Arbitrageurs Face the Spotlight, N.Y. Times,
November 17, 1986, at p. Y21, col. 3; Laderman, Are the "Arbs' Too Cosy with Insiders?, Bus. WK.,
June 16, 1986, at 33-34.
4. See, eg., Bianco, Wall Street's Frantic Push To Clean Up Its Act, Bus. WK., June 9, 1986, at
82-83; Cole, supra note 3; Laderman, supra note 3; Monroe & Leefeldt, Inside Trading Case Appears
to Clamp Wall Street Gossip: Arbitragers Are Speculating Not on Takeover Plays, But on SEC's Next
Move, Wall St. J., May 21, 1986, at p. 2, col. 3.
5. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
6. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
7. See, eg., Alpert, Uneasy Street, Guilty Pleas to Spark New Insider Charges, BARRONS, June
9, 1986, at 16; Bianco, supra note 4; Monroe & Leefeldt, supra note 4; The SEC v. Wall Street, supra
note 2.
8. See Monroe & Leefeldt, supra note 4.
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I. THE PROHIBITION OF INSIDER TRADING UNDER THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934-Chiarella and Dirks
Courts have interpreted rule lOb-5,9 promulgated by the SEC pursuant
to statutory authority under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934,10 to embody an alternative duty to disclose material nonpublic
information or refrain from trading until such information becomes pub-
lic. 1 In the 1960's and 1970's, some courts greatly expanded the scope
of rule lOb-5, imposing a duty to disclose or abstain upon any person
possessing material nonpublic information. 12 In Chiarella and Dirks,
however, the Supreme Court restricted the class of persons subject to
liability for insider trading.
In Chiarella v. United States 13 the Court reversed the conviction of a
printing firm's employee who, while printing takeover bid announce-
ments, deciphered the secret identity of the target corporations and
reaped great profits trading in their securities. The duty to disclose or
abstain, the Court held, applies only to persons owing an independent
duty to disclose to the selling shareholders.' 4 Unlike corporate insiders
who have a fiduciary duty to shareholders, Chiarella was a "complete
stranger."'" He owed no duty to selling shareholders.
Dirks v. SEC 6 further narrowed the scope of rule lOb-5. In Dirks,
Secrest, a former officer of Equity Funding Corporation of America
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1982).
11. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). For a brief description of the development of
rule lOb-5 as applied to insider trading prior to Chiarella and Dirks, see Case Comment, Tippee
Liability Under Rule 10b-5 Predicated on Whether Tipper Tips to Secure Personal Benefit, 62 WASH.
U.L.Q. 165, 166-71 (1984).
In the tender offer context, rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1986), promulgated by the SEC
pursuant to statutory authority under section 14(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14(e) (1982), pur-
ports to expand the insider trading prohibitions beyond those provided in rule lOb-5 as limited by
Chiarella and Dirks. Rule 14e-3 prohibits trading by any person possessing material information
relating to a tender offier, if that person "knows or has reason to know it has been acquired directly
from" the offeror, the target corporation, or any "officer, director, partner or employer or any other
person acting on behalf of the" offeror or target. 17 C.F.R. at § 240.14e-3(a) (1986). Although rule
14e-3 has yet to be challenged in the courts, in view of Chiarella and Dirks commentators question
the authority of the SEC to promulgate the rule.
12. See, e.g., Schapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974); Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 833.
13. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
14. Id. at 231-35.
15. 445 U.S. at 232-33.
16. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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tipped Dirks, an investment analyst, as to the fraudulent activities of the
company. Dirks, in turn, exposed the fraud, but not before tipping his
institutional clients who sold a substantial portion of their holdings of
Equity Funding shares. The Court reversed the SEC's censure of Dirks,
holding that a tippee's duty to disclose or abstain derives from the duty
of a tipper to disclose or abstain.7 A tippee acquires a duty to disclose
or abstain only when he knew or should have known that the tipper
breached his duty to the selling shareholders under Chiarella.x8 The
Court further held that a tipper breaches this duty only when he benefits
personally from the disclosure.1 9 Because Secrest intended only to ex-
pose the fraud,2" he breached no fiduciary duty. Dirks, consequently,
derived no duty to disclose or abstain.
In footnote 14 of the opinion, however, the Court expanded the tradi-
tional definition of "insiders." When corporate officials reveal inside in-
formation legitimately to "professionals," the Court stated, these
outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders, "temporary insid-
ers," subject to the rule lOb-5 duty to disclose or abstain.2" The Court
sought to limit this theory to situations in which the corporation expects,
and the relationship implies, that the information is to be kept confiden-
tial.22 But some lower federal courts have interpreted broadly the con-
cept of a "temporary insider."23
17. Id. at 659.
18. Id. at 660-61.
19. Id. at 661-64.
20. Id. at 648-49.
21. Id. at 655 n.14.
22. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons acquired
nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they have entered into a special confiden-
tial relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to
information solely for corporate purposes.
Id.; see also Note, Dirks v. SECs Footnote Fourteen: Horizontal and Verticle Reach, 62 WASH.
U.L.Q. 477 (1984) ("[Footnote fourteen] covers only those persons with preexisting duties to the
issuer's shareholders and, derivatively, those persons who misappropriate inside information from
corporate fiduciaries.").
23. See, e.g., SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983). Lund was the Chief Executive
Officer of Verit Industries. When Horowitz, the chief executive of P & F Industries, Inc., entered
into negotiations with another company concerning a joint venture with P & F, he asked Lund if
Verit would be interested in providing capital for the venture. Lund traded on this information
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II. THE SEC's CASES AGAINST LEVINE AND BOESKY
Beginning in May 1986 the SEC filed a series of civil complaints
against several Wall Street insiders in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York. In addition to injunctive relief
the SEC sought civil penalties under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act
of 1984 in the amount of three times the profits made upon their insider
trading.24 The complaints also formed the basis for criminal charges
against the same individuals. Taken together the complaints allege a net-
work of investment bankers and lawyers who obtained, apparently in the
course of their employment, information concerning extraordinary cor-
porate transactions. 25 Those named in the complaints allegedly traded
upon the information themselves or provided (and sometimes sold) the
information to others who either traded upon or passed along the infor-
mation to others.26 The central figure in each case was Dennis Levine.
At the time the SEC filed its complaint against him, Levine was a man-
aging director, and apparent co-head of the Merger and Acquisition De-
partment, of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.27 The SEC complaint
against Levine alleged that, over approximately five years, he reaped
$12.6 million in profits trading in the shares of 54 companies on the basis
of nonpublic information concerning possible mergers, tender offers,
leveraged buy-outs, recapitalizations, and other extraordinary corporate
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(a) (1982).
25. See Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 5-6, SEC v. Brown, No. 86-
7774 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1986) [hereinafter cited as Brown Complaint]; Complaint for Injunctive and
Other Equitable Relief at 6, SEC v. Reich, No. 86-7775 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1986) [hereinafter cited as
Reich Complaint]. The SEC alleged that David S. Brown, an investment banker with Goldman,
Sachs & Co., and Ilan K. Reich, an attorney with Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, traded upon
information about certain corporate transactions obtained while employed in their respective capaci-
ties by one of the parties to the transaction.
26. See Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 3-4, SEC v. Boesky, No. 86-
8767 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1986) [hereinafter cited as Boesky Complaint]; Brown Complaint, supra
note 25, at 6-7; Reich Complaint, supra note 25, at 5-6. Brown disclosed information to Ira B.
Sokolow, an investment banker for Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb Inc. and its successor Shear-
son/Lehman American Express, who allegedly sold this information to Levine. Reich disclosed the
information he received directly to Levine. Levine allegedly then passed the information along to
Robert M. Wilkis, an investment banker with Lazard Freres & Co. and E.F. Hutton & Co., who
allegedly also provided Levine inside information, and to Boesky. Wilkis and Boesky then allegedly
traded upon the information.
27. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 3, SEC v. Levine, No. 86-3726
(S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1986) [hereinafter cited as Levine Complaint]. Prior to joining Drexel, Levine
was employed by Smith Barney Harris Upham & Co. and Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb Inc. and its
successor Shearson/Lehman American Express.
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transactions. 28 Levine often learned of these impending transactions as
the investment banker representing one of the corporations involved.2 9
Several of the transactions, however, involved companies having no di-
rect relationship with Levine or his investment bank.30 Levine learned of
these transactions, the complaint alleged, "under circumstances in which
he knew or should have known that he obtained the information through
misappropriation or a breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of
trust and confidence or other wrongful acts., 31 Levine settled with the
SEC promising to surrender $11.6 million in profits and to cooperate
with further investigations.32 A federal district court judge subsequently
sentenced Levine on criminal charges to two years in prison.3
Levine's cooperation led to an even bigger case involving "the" arbi-
trageur on Wall Street, Ivan F. Boesky. The complaint against Boesky
alleged that Boesky traded on the basis of information tipped to him by
Levine.34 Initially, the complaint alleged, Levine provided this informa-
tion "to cultivate a relationship with" Boesky.35 The complaint stated,
however, that Boesky later agreed to compensate Levine. According to
the SEC, Boesky agreed to pay Levine five percent of his trading profits
when Levine provided information leading to Boesky's initial decision to
purchase securities and one percent of his profits when Levine provided
information prompting Boesky "to hold or increase his holdings of a spe-
28. See id. at 17-21. To hide his trading Levine allegedly traded through a foreign financial
institution located in the Bahamas in an account in the names of two Panamanian corporations he
created to advance the scheme. He also used the alias, Mr. Diamond. Moreover, after the SEC
uncovered Levine's trading, Levine allegedly sought to cover up his trading by perjuring himself
before the SEC, having documents at the Bahamian institution destroyed, transfering assets between
accounts in the Bahamian institution, and further attempting to secret those assets to a bank in
Cayman Islands. Id. at 22-25.
29. See id. at 6-7.
30. See Declaration of Leonard W. Wang in Support of Plaintiff's Application for a Temporary
Restraining Order, Order to Show Cause, Order Freezing Assets, Order for an Accounting, Order to
Transfer Assets, Order for Expedited Discovery, Order for Substituted Service and an Order
Preventing Document Alteration or Destruction at 15-18, SEC v. Levine, No. 86-3726 (S.D.N.Y.
May 11, 1986) [hereinafter cited as Declaration of Wang].
31. Levine Complaint, supra note 27, at 15. With respect to these transactions, the SEC relied
simply on "statements Levine made and actions he initiated [that] evidence that he had knowledge of
material nonpublic information." See Declaration of Wang, supra note 30, at 15. The SEC, in
subsequent cases, alleged that Levine "purchased" at least some of this information from and
through other investment bankers. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
32. See Alpert, supra note 7.
33. See Levine Sentenced, Wall St. J., February 20, 1987, at p. 1, col. 6.
34. See supra note 25.
35. Boesky Complaint, supra note 26, at 4.
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cific security."'36  The SEC acknowledged that at no time, did Levine
disclose, or Boesky ever learn of, Levine's sources.3 ' Nevertheless, citing
the alleged agreement, the SEC asserted that Boesky "knew or had rea-
son to know, or acted in reckless disregard of the fact, that the informa-
tion was confidential and had been obtained through misappropriation or
a breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and confi-
dence."'38 Boesky, as Levine, settled with the SEC. He agreed to dis-
gorge $50 million in profits and to pay another $50 million as a civil
penalty.3 9
III. ANALYSIS
Ultimately, the SEC's cases against Levine and Boesky should raise
few objections. To establish insider trading liability against Levine, the
SEC could point to several instances of trading in securities of companies
which had employed Levine himself, or his employer, as an investment
banker in the underlying corporate transaction.40 Indeed, all of the
transactions detailed in the complaint involved such instances.41 With
respect to these transactions, Levine clearly became a "temporary in-
sider." Under the Supreme Court's analysis in footnote 14 of Dirks, he
thus acquired a duty to disclose or abstain.
The SEC also identified trading in securities of companies which had
no relationship with either Levine or his employer. These transactions
present conceptual difficulties not present in Levine's trading of the
shares of his clients. The complaint, for example, detailed Levine's al-
leged transactions in shares of American Natural Resources Co. (ANR).
At the time of these transactions, Levine was acting as an investment
banker for Coastal Corp. in its takeover bid for ANR.42 As an agent of
the acquiring firm Levine was under no duty to the selling shareholders.
He, therefore, acquired no duty to disclose or abstain under Chiarella.43
In attacking these transactions, the SEC apparently relied upon the
36. Id. at 4-5. The SEC alleged that Boesky agreed to pay Levine $2.4 million under the ar-
rangement, but that Levine's arrest prevented payment. Id. at 5.
37. Id. at 4.
38. Id. at 3.
39. See Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief as to Ivan F.
Boesky at 6-7, SEC v. Boesky, No. 86-8767 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1986).
40. Levine Complaint, supra note 27, at 9-13.
41. See Levine Complaint, supra note 27, at 9-15.
42. See Levine Complaint, supra note 27, at 13-15.
43. Cf. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 237-38 (Stevens, J., concurring).
[Vol. 65:282
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"misappropriation" theory of insider trading liability.' Misappropria-
tion theory contemplates liability for insider trading when persons im-
properly obtain nonpublic information and use it contrary to the interests
of its owners.45 If, for example, Levine traded in shares of ANR upon
confidential information obtained from Coastal, misappropriation theory
maintains that his actions operated to defraud Coastal's shareholders, the
owners of the information concerning Coastal's takeover bid, in violation
of rule lOb-5.46 The full Supreme Court refused to consider the misap-
propriation theory in the Chiarella case.47  The Second Circuit subse-
quently reaffirmed, and the Supreme Court has agreed to consider, the
application of misappropriation theory in criminal cases.48 Misappropri-
ation theory seems equally applicable to civil actions brought by the
SEC, at least, as in this case, when the civil action forms the basis for
criminal charges.
From Levine's alleged breach of confidence, the SEC alleged, Boesky
derived a duty to disclose or abstain under the Dirks analysis. The com-
plaint alleges that Boesky had reason to believe that Levine acquired the
information in violation of a duty to his clients and/or employer. Under
the profit-sharing arrangement between Levine and Boesky, Levine
clearly would have benefitted personally from his breach of duty. Thus,
at least with respect to trading upon information about transactions in-
volving companies with a relationship to Levine or his investment bank,
44. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Application for a Temporary Restraining Order,
an Order to Show Cause Why a Preliminary Injunction Should Not Be Entered, an Order Freezing
the Assets of the Defendants, an Order for Transfer of Assets, an Order for an Accounting, an Order
for Substituted Service, an Order for Expedited Discovery and an Order Preventing Document Al-
teration or Destruction at 14-17, SEC v. Levine, No. 86-3726 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1986) [hereinafter
cited as Levine Memorandum].
The SEC also relied upon rule 14e-3 which avoids the limitations of Chiarella and Dirks. See
supra note 11. To the extent that rule 14e-3 is valid, then with respect to transactions involving
shares of companies involved in a tender offer, the SEC would be relieved of relying on misappropri-
ation theory.
45. See Chiarella, 463 U.S. at 239-43 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
46. Cf id. at 235-36.
47. The Court refused to address the Government's arguments based upon the misappropria-
tion theory because it failed to submit the issue to the jury. Id. at 236-37. Chief Justice Burger in
dissent adopted this theory. Id. at 239-43; see also id. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that
"[r]espectable arguments could be made in support of either position" with respect to the appropri-
ateness of applying misappropriation theory).
48. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666 (1986);
see also SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985). The Second
Circuit, however, has refused to apply misappropriation theory in private actions. See Moss v. Mor-
gan Stanley, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984).
1987]
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the SEC's complaints against both Levine and Boesky sufficiently allege
violations of rule lOb-5.
The allegations of insider trading with respect to transactions invol-
ving companies unrelated to either Levine or his employer, however, pre-
sent more difficult issues. In contrast to the detailed account of Levine's
transactions in the securities of companies represented by Levine or his
employer,4 9 the complaint discloses little of the SEC's theory with re-
spect to trading in securities of these unrelated companies. It states only
that Levine knew or should have known that he obtained the information
through misappropriation or breach of fiduciary duty.50 It fails to de-
velop any facts upon which liability could be premised under Dirks.
The SEC, in subsequent cases, alleged that Levine obtained, and often
purchased, this information from and through other investment bank-
ers.5" Yet even these facts would not necessarily establish Levine's liabil-
ity under Dirks. Indeed, this criticism applies equally to the complaint
against Boesky. To establish Boesky's knowledge of Levine's alleged
breach of confidence, the SEC relied exclusively upon the existence of the
profit-sharing agreement between Boesky and Levine.52 From this fac-
tual allegation one could infer that Boesky knew Levine (or Levine's
sources) misappropriated the information or otherwise breached a duty
to the selling shareholders. Alternatively, based upon the inner workings
of Wall Street,53 one could infer that, despite his agreement to share pro-
fits, Boesky believed Levine obtained the information legitimately.
In the context of the Levine and Boesky cases, these shortcomings
likely did little harm. As noted above, the allegations against Levine
clearly are sufficient to establish insider trading liability. As to Boesky
and the more troublesome aspects of the complaint against Levine, the
SEC satisified the requirements of a well-pleaded complaint.54 The SEC
might well have established the necessary factual premises at trial.
Evaluating the SEC's actions only in relation to the Levine and Boesky
cases, however, ignores the effect the SEC's complaints could have upon
activities of investment bankers and arbitrageurs. The SEC's actions
49. See Levine Complaint, supra note 27, at 9-15.
50. See supra text accompanying note 3 1.
51. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
52. See supra text accompanying note 36.
53. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
54. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12.
[Vol. 65:282
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could seriously undermine the salubrious role of investment bankers and
arbitrageurs in the capital markets.
By absorbing risk that inheres in the market, arbitrageurs and invest-
ment bankers help maintain orderly markets." In order to fulfill this
function, they participate in sophisticated information networks which
often include lawyers, corporate executives and investment bankers.5 6
This network, as the Levine and Boesky cases illustrate, provides access
to, and potential abuse of, inside information. Much of the information
that flows through this network, however, may be obtained through legit-
imate activities. Investment bankers and arbitrageurs routinely develop
and decipher, utilize and share information about corporate transac-
tions.57 The line between legitimately obtained information and inside
information may be quite fine.
The mere fact that the SEC has penetrated the Wall Street network
undoubtedly will impair the flow of information between investment
bankers and arbitrageurs.5" But the SEC's willingness to prosecute Wall
Street insiders without sufficient factual support ensure that the Levine
and Boesky cases will have a much broader impact. Coupled with the
SEC's ability to direct public attention, thereby extracting a high price-
in terms of settlements59 and damage to reputations-and perhaps fore-
stalling resistance to its complaints, the complaints against Levine and
Boesky create an unhealthy fear of SEC prosecution. This fear may un-
duly hinder the flow of information between investment bankers and
arbitrageurs.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the cases against Levine and Boesky purport to rest upon
sound legal principles, the SEC should more clearly limit its enforcement
actions than it has in the Levine and Boesky cases. 60 Chiarella and Dirks
can serve to balance the need to regulate insider trading to preserve the
55. See supra note 3.
56. See Laderman, supra note 3, at 32.
57. Investment bankers and arbitrageurs specialize in identifying possible acquisition targets.
Arbitrageurs use this information to speculate in stocks of target corporations. Investment bankers
might use the same information to propose deals to potential clients.
58. Cf supra note 8 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 31 & 38 and accompanying text.
60. See, eg., Bluestein, Disputes Arise Over Value of Laws on Insider Trading, Wall St. J., No-
vember 17, 1986, at p. 14, col 5; Ingersoll, Political Pressure Growing to Stem Trading Excesses, Wall
St. J., November 17, 1986, at p. 15, col. 5; Laderman, supra note 3.
1987]
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integrity of the markets, on the one hand, and the useful function of Wall
Street professionals, on the other. In the absence of a clear breach of
confidence to an employer or client, the SEC should proceed cautiously.
Moreover, the SEC should seek tippee liability only when it can clearly
establish knowledge by a tippee of a breach of such confidence. An over-
zealous enforcement policy can impede the free flow of information ne-
cessary to creating more efficient markets.61
Christine M. Ramatowski
THE WILLIAMS ACT AND PREEMPTION OF SECOND
GENERATION STATE TAKEOVER
LEGISLATION
In 1982, in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,' the United States Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional the Illinois Business Takeover Act.2 A major-
ity of the Court found that the statute impermissibly burdened interstate
commerce.' Three justices argued further that the Williams Act,4 the
principal federal legislation regulating corporate takeovers, preempted
the Illinois act.' Two justices disagreed, interpreting the Williams Act to
leave some room for state regulation of corporate takeovers.
61. See The SEC v. Wall Street, supra note 2; but ef Laderman, supra note 1.
1. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
2. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 12 11/2, § 137.51 et seq. (1979). See infra notes 19-22 and accompany-
ing text.
3. 457 U.S. at 643-46.
4. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(f),
78n(d)-(e) (1982)).
5. 457 U.S. at 620-40. Article VI, clause 2 of the United States Constitution provides that
"the Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." The Supreme Court has held
that the supremacy clause invalidates not only state laws that conflict directly with the operation of
federal law, but also state laws that conflict with the purposes of the federal law. See, e.g., Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1947).
6. Justice Powell found nothing in the Williams Act to suggest "a congressional intent to
prohibit state legislation designed to assure-at least in some circumstances-greater protection to
interests that include but often are broader than those of incumbent management." 457 U.S. at 646,
647 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Stevens discerned no "prohibition against state legislation
Washington University Open Scholarship
